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 Chapter 4: The United Kingdom’s Social Model: From Labour’s New Deal to the 
Economic Crisis and the Coalition 
Ken Mayhew and Mark Wickham-Jones 
 
After thirteen years in office the British Labour Party lost the general election on 6 May 
2010.1 The outcome surprised few: it came after a prolonged economic crisis alongside a 
plethora of difficulties for the administration. The election delivered no overall victor, 
however, and a coalition government of Conservatives and centrist Liberal Democrats 
replaced Labour, promising to tackle the economic crisis through a program of sweeping cuts 
in public spending. In this chapter we discuss how Labour shaped the social model before the 
crisis. We go on to analyze how the resultant configuration of institutions and policies 
influenced both the trajectory of the economic downturn and successive responses to the 
crisis by Labour and then by the Coalition. Labour’s overall approach combined neo-liberal 
elements, especially in terms of a weak regulatory framework for financial institutions, 
alongside a strong commitment to welfare provision, in the form of the National Health 
Service (NHS). We argue that such an approach heightened the vulnerability of the United 
Kingdom to the initial economic shock as the downturn developed into a major fiscal crisis. 
After initially attempting to sustain economic activity, the Labour government came to accept 
the need for some retrenchment. Since 2010, the Coalition has markedly intensified that the 
scope and speed of that retrenchment  in a so-called austerity program. The specific 
institutional configuration of the social model, however, continues to influence the 
development both of economic policy and of economic outcomes in the United Kingdom. 
 
Over the last twenty-five years, academics have highlighted various factors  to explain 
economic and political developments in the United Kingdom. Those identified include the 
ideological nature of successive Conservatives governments, the importance of electoral 
support, and the role played by powerful business interests (see Gamble, 1988; Hall 1988; 
Jessop et al, 1988).More recent scholarship from the Varieties of Capitalism perspective has 
                                                          
1 Thanks to Richard Jobson, Paul Pierson, Fiona Ross and, especially, Andy Martin: responsibility is 
ours.  
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highlighted the liberal market economy character of the British economy as a significant 
determinant of its economic and political relationships (see Hall and Soskice, 2001). From a 
comparative perspective, Bermeo and Pontusson’s discussion of policy responses to the 
2008-9 economic crisis covers similar issues to those in earlier work including ideological, 
electoral, and institutional elements as well as existing policy legacies (2012, 15-16). Our 
discussion highlights that similar factors shaped developments concerning the social model 
up to, during, and after the economic crisis. But a number of features of the British case 
demand emphasis. Nearly two decades of ideologically strident Conservative governments 
moulded the social model’s trajectory in the United Kingdom. In office between 1997 and 
2010, however, Labour developed a distinct program, which contained significant contrasts 
with that of its predecessor administrations. Nor did Labour’s approach reflect the kind of 
measures commonly associated with a liberal market economy. Rather Labour offered a 
package in which market-based elements were combined with an ambitious commitment to 
social provision (on institutional tenacity see Pierson, 1994). Not only was this package 
distinct, it played a significant part in the unfolding of the economic crisis during 2008-9. 
Moreover, the institutional configuration developed by Labour continues to shape the 
Coalition’s  more ideological approach after the change of government in 2010. We begin the 
chapter with an outline of Labour’s approach to the social model in opposition during the 
1990s and continue with a discussion of its development under Labour in office after 1997. 
We detail specific initiatives launched by New Labour and consider their impact on the 
labour market. We go on to examine the impact of the economic crisis on the social model in 
the United Kingdom. But we also illustrate how the configuration of the social model shaped 
that crisis. In our conclusion we draw the strands of our analysis together with observations 
about Labour’s attempt to redefine the social model and the impact of the crisis and as well as 
the Coalition’s response to the economic downturn. 
 
1. From Thatcherism to New Labour 
The initiatives launched by Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997 (especially 
those led by Margaret Thatcher before 1990) had a major impact on the social model in the 
United Kingdom. Successive legislative acts, the abolition of quasi-corporatist institutions, 
and a confrontation in 1984-85 with the once powerful National Union of Mineworkers all 
contributed to a significant reduction in union power (Marsh, 1992). Other factors, some 
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linked to the Conservatives' strategy, shaped these developments including the rising 
unemployment that accompanied the government’s frequently deflationary macroeconomic 
policy and a renewed assertiveness on the part of management (including utilisation of the 
new legal framework). Membership of trade unions in the United Kingdom peaked in 1979 at 
over 13 million. Thereafter, it fell every year bar one to a level of just under eight million in 
1997 (Achur, 2010, 23). The density of trade union membership declined from 48.8 per cent 
in 1979 to 30.9 per cent in 1997 (OECD, 2011). In terms of welfare and social policy, the 
NHS remained in place. However, Conservative governments looked to means tested targeted 
benefits and, as poverty and income inequality increased, so the relevant Gini coefficients 
rose dramatically in the United Kingdom, by more than in most other advanced industrial 
countries (Stewart et al, 2009, 1-5). Regarding skills formation, the Thatcher government 
replaced the quasi corporatist MSC with employer-dominated Training and Enterprise 
Councils and emphasised voluntarism in terms of employer participation (King, 1993; King 
1995). As Conservative prime minister between 1990 and 1997 John Major did little to shift 
this trajectory (Stephens, 1996; Jay, 1994). The UK’s ignominious exit from the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992 defined his administration’s economic policy.  
 
In opposition during the 1980s, the British Labour party had become increasingly bogged 
down in a fratricidal conflict between those wedded to an old-fashioned Keynesian social 
democratic orthodoxy and those who demanded a more interventionist strategy based around 
sweeping public ownership. Neither approach appeared relevant to the United Kingdom or to 
appeal much to the electorate. In the late-1980s, after three general election defeats in a row, 
Labour leader Neil Kinnock had intensified his attempts to modernise the party’s outlook. He 
focused Labour directly towards a conception of the European social model, adopting an 
economic strategy that owed much to continental arrangements. Heavily oriented to the 
supply side, it articulated a series of state interventions as the means of correcting perceived 
market failures. Most notably firms did not invest in research and development because of 
fears that other firms would appropriate the returns.   They did not train their workforces 
because of concerns that skilled workers would be vulnerable to poaching from other 
companies (King and Wickham-Jones, 1998). Regulation was offered as the solution. 
Labour’s orientation towards its own version of the European social model was highlighted 
when the party adopted the slogan, “Business where appropriate: government where 
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necessary” (Labour party, 1990, 6). It was a deliberate echo of the German social democrats’ 
(SPD’s) classic  slogan, “as much competition as possible, as much planning as necessary”. 
Especially important around this time was the visit by Jacques Delors, then president of the 
European Commission, to the annual meeting of organised labour, the Trade Union Congress, 
at Bournemouth in September 1988 (Beavis, 1988). Delors’ call for the European project to 
include a social dimension and collective bargaining was embraced by the British trade 
unions. Given the hitherto implacable hostility exhibited by many towards European 
arrangements, it was a remarkable volte face.  
 
Perhaps most noteworthy was the party’s attitude towards employer-union relations and wage 
setting, an area long dominated by the labour movement’s belief in free collective bargaining. 
Though the party persisted in rejecting any hint of a formal incomes policy, Labour did note 
the success of particular European arrangements in containing inflation through coordinated 
and synchronised pay bargaining. Before the 1992 general election, the party drew up semi-
secret plans to initiate a similar framework for collective bargaining in the United Kingdom 
(Butler and Kavanagh, 1992, 50). The initiative seemed to be at odds with the erosion of 
national and sectoral pay bargaining that had occurred in the 1980s. The theoretical impetus 
came from the influential paper by Lars Calmfors and John Driffill (1988), which suggested 
that economies with either strongly centralised or fully decentralised wage bargaining 
systems would perform well – but not those countries which lay between the two extremes. 
David Soskice (1990) offered a British adaptation that emphasised the importance of 
coordinated institutional solutions to collective action problems. 
 
Kinnock’s reformed Labour did not win the April 1992 general election.  In the aftermath of 
the UK’s ejection from the ERM, however, the terrain of British politics changed 
dramatically in  favor of Labour, immediately reversing the party’s standing in opinion polls. 
In 1994, newly elected as leader, Tony Blair intensified the modernisation program, recasting 
the party as ‘New Labour’ and persuading it to ditch Clause IV, its historic commitment to 
sweeping public ownership (Wickham-Jones, 1997). In his 1995 Mais lecture, painting a 
bleak picture of the options open to any reforming administration, Blair insisted that low 
inflation must be the prime objective of economic policy. Labour went on to accept existing 
5 
 
rates of personal taxation and to endorse the spending programs mapped out by the 
Conservative government. In marked contrast with his predecessors, Blair did not look 
towards Europe as the basis for his party’s program. Drawing a frequent distinction between 
what he termed the Anglo-Saxon economic model and that of Germany and Japan, Blair 
explicitly distanced himself from the latter. Both Blair and Gordon Brown, Labour’s shadow 
chancellor of the exchequer, asserted that the continent suffered from Eurosclerosis, 
institutional rigidities that inhibited growth. Blair explicitly rejected the notion that he would 
countenance labour market inflexibilities. 
 
In November 1995, Brown insisted that in future benefits for the young unemployed would 
be conditional (King and Wickham-Jones, 1999). Brown’s plan, called the New Deal, as well 
as Welfare to Work, offered four options to those aged between 18 and 24 years old who had 
been out of work for six months. There would be penalties for those who refused to 
participate. Theoretically, the initiative aimed to reduce the NAIRU (non-accelerating-
inflation rate of unemployment) – that rate of unemployment consistent with stable inflation. 
A publication from the Institute for Public Policy Research argued that the number of long 
term unemployed was likely to increase the NAIRU: ‘the more the long-term unemployed are 
recycled into work, the lower can the NAIRU be’ (Corry and Holtham, 1995, p. 30: Holtham 
and Mayhew, 1996). The most significant external influence came not from Europe but from 
Clinton administration’s welfare program in the United States, a point reinforced more 
generally by Blair’s positive attitude towards America. In terms of skills formation, in March 
1996, Labour ditched the proposal that there should be a levy on business to fund training 
(King and Wickham-Jones, 1998). The idea of synchronising pay settlements, encapsulated in 
the National Economic Assessment, was dropped. The party indicated that the state should 
not be directly involved in relations between employers and workforces. Indeed, Blair’s 
leadership of Labour was marked by a desire to place distance between the party and its 
affiliated trade unions.  
 
Labour remained committed to a minimum wage but it now did not offer a precise level 
(based on a formula), stated that it would establish an independent low pay commission and 
promised full consultations with business. The rate would be lower for younger workers. The 
6 
 
theoretical underpinning for the minimum wage was bolstered by Myth and Measurement 
written by the American economists David Card and Alan Krueger (1995). Monopsonistic 
employers were able to pay workers less than the marginal productivity of their labour. A 
minimum wage would prevent such an outcome without leading to increased unemployment. 
Indeed Ed Balls (1994), then a researcher for Gordon Brown, argued that it was likely to have 
the opposite effect as employers “hire more people to make up some of the lost profit”. 
 
2. New Labour and the Social Model 
After its landslide victory in May 1997, New Labour won further elections under Tony Blair 
in June 2001 and, with a reduced majority, in May 2005. In June 2007, after much 
speculation and internal political conflict, Tony Blair resigned to be replaced by Gordon 
Brown (chancellor of the exchequer since 1997). During these three terms, the party launched 
a number of initiatives concerning the social model. Before that and immediately on entering 
office, Labour altered the economic policy framework in a fundamental fashion. On 6 May 
1997, Brown handed over operational independence for the conduct of monetary policy to the 
Bank of England. The logic was straightforward: by ceding control over the setting of interest 
rates, Brown wanted to establish a credible reputation with financial markets as a trustworthy, 
honest and moderate actor. Markets need not fear the manipulation of interest rates for 
political gain in a suboptimal fashion: ministers no longer had the capacity to do so 
(Wickham-Jones, 2002). Another economic decision, made some time later, which had 
profound consequences was that taken in 2003 not to join the European Economic and 
Monetary Union.  
 
Welfare State Reforms 
The Blair government’s initial approach to the NHS was constrained by its acceptance of the 
Conservatives’ public spending plans (Shaw, 2007; Bosanquet 2007). After a couple of years, 
this ceiling was lifted to be replaced by dramatic increases in funding accompanied by some 
structural reforms in provision. In January 2000, aware that provision was a major source of 
public concern, Tony Blair promised, pretty much out of the blue, during a television 
interview to match average health funding in European countries (around 8 per cent of GDP) 
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by 2006 (Watt, 2000; Glennester, 2005, 286). Subsequently, a number of Brown’s budgets, 
particularly those of 2002 and 2004, increased the resources allocated to health (though the 
extent of real increases was offset by higher than average inflation in the health sector and by 
wage increases). Levels of health expenditure just about doubled in real terms from some £60 
billion in 1999/00 to around £120 billion in 2008/09. The average annual real increase 
(before the economic crisis) was 6.3 per cent (Chote et al, 2010, 10). Both in terms of its 
absolute level and share of GDP, by the end of Labour’s period in office, levels of spending 
on the NHS were historically unprecedented. In 1997, according to the OECD, spending on 
health was at 6.6 per cent of GDP; by 2009 it was at 9.8 per cent (partly reflecting the 
recession). By 2010, spending was above the European average. 
 
The government reformed the allocative mechanisms for provision of health: it increased 
patient options, introduced greater competition between different providers within the 
service, and enhanced the role of the private sector. After 2001, Blair mapped out a public 
service reform discourse emphasizing individual choice. Some initiatives echoed the reforms 
previously undertaken by the Conservative and criticised then by Labour. In a measure that 
proved divisive within the party, Labour established foundation hospitals  which enjoyed 
greater freedom in their planning and wider incentives for their activities. There was a 
pronounced regional aspect to these measures: they had far more impact in England than the 
devolved parts of the United Kingdom. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) under which 
much hospital (and other public sector) construction took place was also controversial: critics 
suggested it piled up future debts (predominantly in the form of cash liabilities) while leaving 
risks with public authorities.  
 
Higher expenditure on the NHS was accompanied by increased public spending elsewhere. 
Public expenditure as a proportion of GDP increased from 36.9 per cent in 2000-01 to 41.1 
per cent in 2007-08 (it had been around the same level in 1997). Tax increases funded some 
of this expansion but public debt also rose. By 2003, in contrast to the tight controls Labour 
had exerted on public finances between 1997 and 1999, the state of government finances had 
deteriorated, and Labour was borrowing to support the increases in spending (Smith, 2005, 
173). Spending on education shot up dramatically in real terms, from below £50 billion in 
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1999/00 to nearly £75 billion in 2007/08. It rose as a proportion of GDP to over 5 per cent (an 
average annual real increase of 4.3 per cent – Chote et al, 2010, 10). Brown boosted not only 
current spending but the resources allocated to public investment, which had fallen under 
Conservative governments. After 2001, such spending increased steadily (albeit from a 
relatively low level), reaching a peak of nearly 3.5 percent of national income at the end of 
the decade (as GDP fell sharply). Overall, public spending as a proportion of national 
produce rose by more than other countries: spending on public services increased  by much 
more than it had under the Conservatives between 1979 and 1997 (4.4 per cent in real terms 
as against 0.7 per cent, Chote et al, 2010, 1). Such increases appear to be odds with aspects of 
the discourse that Blair frequently articulated. His 1999 joint statement with the German 
chancellor Gerhard Schröder (2000,  164) noted, ‘Public expenditure as a proportion of 
national income has more or less reached the limit of acceptability.’  
 
Reflecting an electoral imperative, Labour was wary of putting up taxes. In 1997, the party 
promised not to increase the basic or top rates of income tax. The pledge was repeated in 
2001 and 2005. Initially, revenue increases focused on a windfall tax on privatised utilities 
and on “stealth” taxes, so-called because they did not have an immediate impact on pay 
packets. In 2002 Brown increased national insurance contributions (thus coming close to 
breaking his promise on income tax, given the similarity between the two charges) 
specifically to fund increased health spending. Much of the subsequent increase in public 
expenditure was financed by borrowing. 
 
As developed in opposition, Labour’s initiative to tackle youth unemployment, the New Deal, 
concerned measures to help those out of work prepare for the labour market (Stewart, 2005). 
The program was later institutionalised and extended in a range of New Deals to cover other 
groups struggling to find employment. Under what was termed the gateway, it helped prepare 
people for the labour market through interviews and advice. Employers were offered 
subsidies to take on the long term unemployed. Given the threat that a failure to comply 
would prompt penalties, those out of work were put under pressure to participate. Brown 
followed this up with an attempt to integrate the tax and benefits system more fully, so 
improving incentives for individuals to take jobs and enhancing protection for those whose 
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work exposed them to poverty levels of pay. Launched in 1998, the Working Families Tax 
Credit (WFTC) became, in effect, an integral part of the New Deal: by offering 
supplementary payments to those taking low paid work, it aimed to eliminate the poverty trap 
whereby people might be better off (or not much worse off) on benefits. In effect the 
government subsidised low pay with a supplementary top up.  
 
Other measures built on the WFTC, encouraging entry into the labour market. In March 
1999, Blair offered a detailed critique of child poverty and subsequently the government 
proposed to halve the rate of it by 2010. In marked contrast to the 1997 document, Labour’s 
2001 manifesto revealed a concern with deprivation (Stewart, 2009, 11). Labour broadened 
the WFTC into a Working Tax Credit and a Child Tax Credit, improved maternity leave 
provisions, and, under the Surestart program, offered help with childcare provision. At the 
same time, however, policies tightened eligibility requirements for those unable to work (for 
example, on disability benefit or with caring commitments) and stiffened penalties for those 
who did not comply. During its first year Labour had signalled a tough line by implementing 
a previously announced cut in benefit for lone parents. The government’s discourse explicitly 
suggested that, by damaging incentives to work, over-generous welfare provision engendered 
dependency among recipients. While Labour frequently extended such a neoliberal and 
conservative rhetoric over welfare, such as in the harsh tone surrounding the New Deals,  
many of its interventions were redistributive in their practical orientation (Taylor, 2007, 221). 
Government figures indicated that on average changes to the tax-benefit system between 
1996-7 and 2003-4 made a family with children around £800 better off per annum in real 
terms, with those in the poorest fifth of the population enjoying a gain nearly four times that 
figure ( Blair, 2005). Many initiatives involved the targeting of specific groups and by 2007 
six million families received tax credits of one form or another (Sinclair 2007, 188). Labour 
also, as promised, introduced a minimum wage and signed up to the European social charter.     
 
Employment relations under New Labour 
Blair rejected any hint that his government might strengthen the power of organised labour, 
(Taylor, 2001; Taylor 2005 and Taylor 2007). He did not hide his view that unions had been 
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responsible for some of the difficulties encountered by the British economy: Frequently at 
pains to reassure business about his intentions, his rhetoric towards them was often 
patronising and dismissive. There would be no repeal of the labyrinth of laws passed by the 
Thatcher governments during the 1980s. That said, Labour did, especially during its first term 
of office, pass some legislation of relevance to workers, most notably the 1999 Employment 
Rights Act which enshrined in law an individual’s right to join a union under certain 
conditions and introduced provisions whereby unions could claim recognition from 
employers for bargaining purposes. The government also offered greater protection against 
unfair dismissal. The legislation’s passage involved considerable negotiation and hard-
fighting on the part of the unions and their few allies within Labour. In 2004, a second piece 
of legislation made some minor modifications. Although modest in scope, the introduction of 
such measures reflected the sense that New Labour’s rhetoric could be more neoliberal than 
its policy. 
 
New Labour’s legislation did little, either in the workplace or in the political arena, however, 
to strengthen trade unions, either in terms of representation or of power. A 2004 report 
indicated that two thirds of workplaces did not recognise unions (Moran et al, 2011: 99). By 
2010, only 46 per cent of employees were covered by collective agreements (a slight decline 
over the previous decade): 64.5 per cent in the public sector and 16.5 per cent in the private 
sector (Achur, 2010:  13; Blanchflower et al, 2007: 11). Trade union density continued to fall: 
for public sector employees, between 1995 and 2010, it fell by 5.0 percentage points to 56.3 
per cent; for the private sector, over the same period, it fell by 7.2 percentage points to 14.2 
per cent. Overall, it was down to 26.5 per cent. Trade union membership in the private sector 
fell to 2.5 million in 2010, from  3.4 million in 1995 (Achur, 2010, 4). Since the early 1990s, 
collective pay bargaining had been confined to the company, or even to the establishment 
level (multi-employer industry wide bargaining had pretty much disappeared during Margaret 
Thatcher’s governments). Accordingly, employment relations in the United Kingdom had 
become less inclusive and more prone to generate inequality. New Labour did not reverse this 
development.  
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Gordon Brown’s hostility towards tripartism and consensus building structures was as 
implacable as that of Blair. In his 1999 Mais lecture, he commented scathingly about ‘vested 
interests cooking up compromises in smoke filled rooms’ (Brown, 2001, 126). At the end of 
the lecture, Brown turned to responsibility in pay setting: he offered no indication that he 
believed it should be developed through some sort of institutionalized partnership. A few 
tripartite bodies such as the Arbitration and Conciliation Service, and the Health and Safety at 
Work Executive remained but their role was marginal and they suffered budget cuts (Taylor, 
2007, 228).  
 
While Labour signed up to the Social Chapter, the government did not endorse continental 
models of social partnership. Arrangements, it believed, should be bilateral and localised. 
Occasional ad hoc discussions took place between government, unions and employers but 
Labour blocked for some time, with tactical support from the German social democrats, the 
European Union directive on information and consultation (Taylor, 2001, 262). When it was 
finally adopted most employers regarded it as a trivial matter. Significantly, neither the TUC 
nor many unions took much interest in it. Most preferred to focus on maintaining, where it 
existed, collective bargaining. The number of workplaces without some form of consultation 
rose to 62 per cent by 2006 (Purcell and Hall, 2011). The government opposed the European 
Union directive on working time though it too was eventually accepted, albeit with a 
voluntary opt-out. Between 1997 and 2007, Robert Taylor concludes that the United 
Kingdom was the only country in the European Union to reject “the use of institutional 
partnerships or social dialogues between the state, capital and labour at national, regional or 
company level” (Taylor, 2007, 220).  
 
Such an approach led to tensions between Labour and the unions. A few (the Fire Brigades 
Union and the Rail Maritime and Transport Workers) disaffiliated and broke their formal 
links to the party. There were some struggles over public service reform (and the changes to 
employment practices as workers were transferred from the state to the private sector, not 
least as part of PFI schemes). In 2004, at Warwick, the party and unions mapped out an 
agenda for a third Labour term in office. Whether the agreement either amounted to a 
reassertion of union influence or was honored in full by the government is questionable. 
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Nevertheless most unions remained wedded to achieving their goals through a political route 
based on a close relationship with the Labour party. There was little enthusiasm for works 
councils or other forms of codetermination. The labour movements' historic antipathy to such 
arrangements, which it had long claimed threatened to emasculate workers, persisted.  
 
Skills formation 
Both of the measures that Labour designed in opposition to enhance skills formation - 
individual learning accounts and establishment of a University for Industry - failed and were 
dropped (the former partly because of fraud; the latter, according to Dan Corry, ‘while  a 
great slogan never amounted to much’, 2011, s127). Instead, Labour focused on a range of 
initiatives, targeting not just those returning to work but many already in employment.  
Launched in 2006, the Train to Gain program initially provided subsidies to employers who 
trained workers without Level 2 qualifications to that level. Subsequently it was extended to 
offer a broader range of subsidies. At times, Labour’s skills policy, particularly the 
justification for giving massive public subsidies to employers, was confused as ministers 
offered a range of reasons which (at least in public statements) mixed economic efficiency 
objectives with distributional ones. The notion that subsidizing employers to award low level 
vocational qualifications would improve a worker’s labour market prospects underpinned the 
redistributive dimension.  But individual rates of return to low level vocational qualifications 
were frequently modest. The standard efficiency justification for training subsidies is that of 
market failure. While employers may make privately optimal decisions, the aggregate of 
these choices will be socially sub-optimal because of the likelihood that employees (once 
trained) will move to another employer.  As a result of this collective action problem, firms 
taking account of this probability will not invest sufficiently in skills formation. However, 
Labour’s official pronouncements justified subsidies on at least two other grounds.  The first 
was that employers were not even making privately optimal decisions.  The second raised the 
possibility that, even if there was sufficient training for present purposes, employers should 
invest in skills for future production needs. Such supposed needs were linked to the perceived 
need for more skill-intensive, higher value added products. This was part of the high skills 
vision espoused by New Labour as the only feasible strategy for competing in a globalised 
economy. The emphasis placed on skills in underpinning such a strategy appeared to rest on 
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the assumption that more and higher quality skills would lead to higher quality production. 
Critics claimed that the approach would lead to an under-utilisation of skills. They argued 
that a more active industrial strategy was needed to improve production in the United 
Kingdom. In 2001, the government replaced the Training and Enterprise Councils with a 
Learning and Skills Council which had numerous local branches (Owen, 2001, 219). It was 
not an especially successful initiative and, soon after becoming prime minister, Gordon 
Brown abolished the Council. Meanwhile skills policy was delivered by a series of sector 
skills councils, supervised initially by the Sector Skills Development Agency, and 
subsequently by the Commission for Employment and Skills.  However, designing measures 
that enhanced skills formation without alienating employers or simply subsidising low wages 
was not straightforward.   
 
Labour’s thinking about training shifted as the party placed more emphasis on generic skills 
than it had in the early 1990s. Accordingly, Blair’s government expanded higher education 
and other post compulsory provision, arguing that the qualifications acquired at tertiary level 
would prove valuable in the labour market, regardless of their link to specific jobs. David 
Soskice (1992) had provided a theoretical underpinning, arguing argued that the United 
Kingdom did not have the necessary institutional configuration necessary for a dirigiste 
framework of more vocational, work-based training.  As a necessary pre-condition for this 
change of emphasisLabour encouraged individuals to stay on at school through an 
Educational Maintenance Allowance,. However, changes in the location and type of skills 
produced did not necessarily solve the problem of their under-utilisation. 
 
Overall, a number of factors shaped Labour’s approach to the social model between 1997 and 
2010. The government paid considerable attention to the Thatcherite legacy that it inherited 
and to the perceived popular preferences of the electorate which, while pro-NHS, were also 
held to be extremely moderate (Hay, 1999). Many of Labour’s measures reflected the liberal 
market character of the British economy and the government took great care in its relations 
with business (especially with media corporations). But the extent of many initiatives, for 
example the spending on the NHS and the interventions of the New Deal, went well beyond 
what might have been expected on this basis. Labour’s program did not conform to a 
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particular ideal type – either as a liberal market based one or as a specific welfare regime. 
Instead, certain core features underpinning the distinctiveness of Labour’s social model can 
be identified. First, in designing policy interventions, Blair’s governments put an original 
emphasis on duties and responsibilities. Second, such obligations were enforced by penalties 
which gave some measures a manifestly illiberal character. Aspects of the program were 
contractual and arguably intolerant in their character. Third, the government focused on work 
as the central means by which poverty would be tackled. Brown (2006, 80 and 113) argued 
“simply compensating people for their poverty through benefits is not enough.… We must 
give people the chance to work, if they can.” On another occasion he was equally forthright, 
“The best form of welfare is work.”  
 
The central objective of New Labour’s social model in many ways was the development of a 
flexible labour market. Senior figures within Labour and commentators differed as to what 
defined “flexibility”. But repeatedly the government launched initiatives to increase labour 
market flexibility in some form or other. In 2001, Blair (2001) told the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) that “we have one of the most flexible labour markets of any major 
economy.” He went on, “According to the OECD, the UK has among the least regulated 
product and labour markets of any industrialised country.” He promised: “It will stay that 
way.” Blair’s joint statement with Gerhard Schröder (2000, 168)  put considerable emphasis 
upon flexibility, going so far as to  suggest that “flexible markets are a modern social 
democratic aim.” Brown (2008) echoed such claims, telling the Scottish CBI that the United 
Kingdom had “the most flexible labour market in Europe”. In 2002, he argued, “In the past 
the Labour party – like the rest of Europe – has not been very good at facing up to issues 
relating to flexibility. Indeed flexibility was often a term of abuse… Yet flexibility is, in 
reality, the ability to respond to change with speed.” He was blunt: “It is the necessary 
precondition of success” (Brown, 2006, 42). Prosperity and the alleviation of poverty 
demanded growth. That, in turn, demanded flexibility. Flexibility led to increased 
productivity. Human capital formation (through improved skills) was an important dimension 
of labour market flexibility: it enhanced the capacity for individuals to move from job to job, 
improving their position within the labour market. Flexibility also required incentives to 
persuade individuals to take work and so ensure a steady supply of labour. State 
interventions, such as the New Deals, needed to be tailored to such a framework. Workers 
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would be protected, Blair argued in a 2007 Manchester speech, neither through power in the 
workplace nor through trade union membership generally but through the position they 
enjoyed in the labour market as a result of their enhanced human capital. Immigration helped 
sustain the model with high levels of ready trained skilled workers entering the labour market 
alongside plentiful numbers of unskilled workers prepared to take low wages (for often 
unattractive work). As such, flexibility had a number of different dimensions including 
financial (workers accepting lower wage rates), temporal (adjusting the hours of work and 
shifts), numerical (changing the numbers in employment) and functional (no restrictive 
practises) as well as mobility (Brown, 2006, 49-50). A flexible labour market was one in 
which employment was not strongly regulated, in which it was easy to take workers on (and 
if necessary get rid of them), and in which people moved around freely from job to job in 
different localities. In the next section we examine how these policies shaped labour market 
outcomes. 
 
3. Employment and Income Distribution  
Between 1997 and 2007, the British economy grew at, by historical and comparative 
standards, an impressive rate (though the recovery from the ERM debacle of 1992 had begun 
before Labour’s election to office). From the mid-1990s until 2007 the average annual growth 
rate was 3.3 per cent, close to the growth in productive capacity. By 2007 Brown (2007) 
claimed to have delivered “the longest period of economic stability and sustained growth in 
our country’s history”. Repeatedly he argued that the British economy would never return to 
cycles of boom and bust. To make clear where blame for past performance should be placed, 
he often referred to “Tory boom and bust” (e.g., Brown, 2000).  
 
New Labour and the labour market 
At 75 per cent by 2008, the employment rate in the United Kingdom was high, whilst 
unemployment, having fallen to levels lower than in France, Germany or the United States, 
was at a historically low level (see Gregg and Wadsworth, 2010, 1). Many of the jobs created 
were either in the public sector or with firms which relied heavily on public sector contracts. 
Public sector employment rose from around 5.5 million in 2000 to nearly 6.3 million in 
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2009,with a leap at the end of the period as a result of banking nationalisations(Office for 
National Statistics, 2012)). The NAIRU also fell and compared well with the equivalent 
measure in comparator countries.  Table 1 relates the OECD’s estimates of the rise and fall of 
the UK’s NAIRU since 1971 to the measured unemployment rate. 
 Table 1: The NAIRU and measured unemployment in the United Kingdom, percent 
    NAIRU  Measured unemployment 
1971       4.5   4.1 
1976                  5.3   5.3 
1981       8.4   9.6 
1986       9.9              11.3 
1991                  8.9   8.8 
1996       7.8   8.1 
2001       5.8   5.1 
2006         5.7   5.5 
2011                    6.9   8.1      
Source: StatExtracts, http//stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx 
 
To assess the importance of New Labour’s initiatives in shaping this outcome, we need the 
relevant economic theory, starting with Nickell’s 1990 account. Defined as that level of 
unemployment consistent with stable inflation, there is dispute about the relative roles of the 
demand and supply sides in governing the NAIRU. Economists such as Nickell contend that 
the NAIRU is determined by the supply side (broadly defined as the institutions of the labour 
market) and by real wage resistance.  According to this view demand management policies 
can drive measured unemployment above or below the NAIRU but cannot alter it. Other 
economists argue that the demand side can have a long run influence via a process of 
hysteresis.       
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Nickell describes a three-dimensional trade-off between unemployment, the stability of 
inflation, and the current account of the balance of payments. There is always a negative 
trade off between unemployment and the other two variables: a fall in unemployment either 
threatens the stability of inflation or the health of the balance of payments (or both). How 
malign or benign the trade-off is depends on the state of a country’s supply side. The 
configuration of labour market institutions, including the legal framework and cultural norms, 
will shape the relationship between these variables. Nickell argues that the demand side can 
have no influence on the trade-off: demand management simply locates a point on it. There is 
one position where the level of unemployment is consistent, not just with stable inflation, but 
also with balanced trade. This location is the internationalized NAIRU or equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. In countries with a malign trade off it is high; in those with a benign trade off 
it is low. In Nickell’s analysis, any government that is dissatisfied with the trade-off (and the 
rate of unemployment) can improve it only by identifying those elements of the supply side 
which are causing the problems and taking necessary actions to alter them.  
 
Matters become more complicated if we entertain the possibility that the demand side might 
affect the NAIRU. Imagine that measured unemployment is equal to the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. There is an exogenous shock to demand which drives up measured 
unemployment. A “classical” analysis, deploying expectations augmented Phillips curves, 
would suggest that after a period of adjustment the economy would find itself back at the 
original equilibrium rate. By contrast, those who believe in long-lasting hysteresis argue that 
the equilibrium rate might recalibrate and adjust to the new, higher measured rate. The 
possibility of hysteresis is one reason why empirical investigations of the precise reasons for 
the fall of the NAIRU are inconclusive. Another problem in estimating the impact of reforms 
to the supply side concerns the difficulty involved in finding “proxies” for complex 
institutional variables in econometric analysis. There is general agreement that reduced union 
power and lower replacement ratios played an important role in the reduction of the NAIRU 
under Conservative administrations with mismatch acting as a partially countervailing force.  
It also seems clear that the NAIRU fell by more than the equilibrium rate, the difference 
being accounted for by exchange rate policy. This outcome can be explained as follows.   If 
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measured unemployment falls, thus putting pressure on the rate of inflation, this impact can 
be offset by a rise in the exchange rate.  From 1986, Conservative governments followed 
such a strategy, ensuring that measured unemployment could be brought down without any 
apparent upward pressure on inflation. There are consequences for the current account of the 
balance of payments, which was in deficit under the Conservatives from 1985 onwards. The 
deficit was sustained by offsetting capital inflows. 
  
Until the 2008 recession, the NAIRU continued to fall, though not by much. This modest 
decrease is consistent with the observation that, as far as employment relations were 
concerned, the Labour government largely maintained its predecessors’ stance without 
launching dramatic new initiatives, whilst it pursued a rigorous social security policy via the 
New Deal. Brown’s 1999 Mais lecture was couched directly in such terms, arguing that 
alongside structural reforms, “The more our welfare to work reforms allow the long term 
unemployed to re-enter the active labour market, the more it will be possible to reduce 
unemployment without increasing inflationary pressure” (Brown, 2001, 133). Elsewhere, 
noting the importance of labour market flexibility for reducing the NAIRU, he bemoaned the 
fact that the United Kingdom did not compare well to the United States (Brown, 2006, 49). 
 
What impact did the various New Deals have?  Evaluations have found that they were 
generally effective at moving people out of social security into work. Why did such measures 
not further reduce the NAIRU? One possible explanation concerns the composition of 
unemployment. Whenever governments use subsidies to find people jobs, there will be 
displacement or substitution effects.  These effects mean that for any group of people who 
obtain work through the subsidy, there is another group, not eligible for it, which lose or fail 
to obtain work that they might otherwise have found.  One justification for subsidies is that, 
even if this happens, there will be a change in the composition of unemployment. The 
essence of the New Deals is that people are “forced” back into work after some period in 
receipt of benefits. This  suggests that, even if aggregate unemployment is not reduced, there 
will be a fall in its average duration.  Conventionally, macroeconomists argue that the longer 
a person is unemployed the less bidding pressure that person can exert on the labour market 
and the less downward pressure on the real wage. If average duration can be reduced, this 
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should exert downward pressure on the NAIRU. Average duration did fall under New Labour 
and this probably contributed to the continued fall in the NAIRU. However, the impact was 
probably moderated because  the employment impact of the New Deals was concentrated in 
the very lower reaches of the labour market whilst a lack of upward mobility, or partial 
labour market segmentation, inhibited any impact on the labour market as a whole. 
 
The New Deals’ impact was further limited because some participants would have found 
work anyway and some of those helped were subsequently made redundant and exited the 
labour market: according to one estimate 40 per cent were on benefit again within six months 
(Toynbee and Walker, 2010, 203). Many went into temporary jobs.  Its coercive element may 
have resulted in some leaving the labour market altogether. The original New Deal was far 
cheaper than had been anticipated: many participants entered the labour market directly as a 
result of the gateway process without a subsidised placement or training element. But critics 
claimed that it remained expensive: in some groups targeted by Labour, unemployment had 
already been falling in the last days of John Major’s government. Moreover, unemployment 
among those targeted in the New Deals did not fall by much more than among other groups. 
When it did fall, the government’s record regarding particular groups within the labour 
market was mixed. A 2005 report in 2005 estimated that 20 per cent of those between 16 and 
24 were not in education, work or training (Taylor, 2007, 237). 
 
In terms of labour productivity, Labour’s strategy was partially successful. Broadly, two 
generic sources of improved productivity can be distinguished: static efficiency gains from 
the more efficient deployment of the existing factors of production and dynamic efficiency 
gains from new investment. Conservative governments emphasised enhanced static 
efficiency.  It was a significant motivation behind their trade union reforms and it was linked 
to numerous other policy initiatives, including privatization and market deregulation. They 
put less emphasis on dynamic efficiency.  Although reforms to corporation taxation in the 
mid-1980s were intended to make more funds available for investment, the United 
Kingdom’s investment/GDP ratio remained low relative to those of her major competitors. R 
& D performance also showed relatively little improvement. 
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In office, Labour frequently referred to five drivers of productivity growth (Brown, 2006, 75; 
Balls et al, 2004, 29-40). These were: 
 Investment in physical capital; 
 Innovation ( the successful exploitation of new ideas); 
 Skills; 
 Enterprise  (the seizing of new business opportunities by both start-ups and existing 
firms); 
 Competition (the incentive to innovate and allocation of resources to the most 
efficient firms). 
These drivers combine static and dynamic approaches.  Labour’s discourse placed 
considerable emphasis on improved productivity and the measures that it adopted continued 
to  close the gap (as measured by productivity per worker hour) with France and Germany. 
They did not eliminate it (see Figure 1). Major gains had already been secured by the 
Thatcher and Major administrations through static efficiency. Arguably, Labour’s policies did 
little more than offer a continuation of those earlier initiatives. Labour failed to improve 
significantly dynamic effiency with respect to either investment/GDP ratios or the United 
Kingdom’s R &D performance. Much stress was placed on  training strategy and on 
expanding higher education – in other words on improving labour quality.  The impact of 
such measures on productivity is a matter of some controversy  (Van Reenen, 2013; see also 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2013).  An alternative approach would have 
been to consider different approaches geared to extracting higher productivity from already 
skilled workforces. Put starkly, if employers were not altering their demand for skills, there 
was a danger that the extra education funded by Labour would be significantly under-utilised 
in the labour market.  An additional criticism suggested that some of the extra skills being 
developed were only small, incremental, low level improvements in the capabilities of the 
workforce and were therefore unlikely to have major impacts on productivity. 
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Figure 1: GDP per hour worked – 2000-10 averages at 2005 $ PPP 
 
Source: D Corry et al, 2011  
 
New Labour and income distribution 
Figure 2 gives some details of new Labour’s impact on inequality for four different measures 
of income.2 On this chart, original income refers to income before any government 
intervention; gross income adjusts for cash benefits and tax credits from the state; disposable 
income makes a further adjustment for direct taxes, employees’ national insurance 
contributions and council (local) tax; and post-tax income is calculated after making further 
adjustment for the impact of indirect taxes. The chart indicates that inequality in original 
income rose from the early 1980s until around 1993-94. From that point on, the situation 
more or less stabilised.  Unsurprisingly, this is reflected in the time profile shown by 
earnings, the major component of original income.  Under New Labour there was no further 
rise in inequality on this measure, but little decline either. As we have argued, New Labour 
                                                          
2 The term equivalized used in the chart reflects the fact that the unit of analysis is the household: 
“equivalization is a standard methodology that takes into account the size and composition of 
households and adjusts their incomes to recognise differing demands on resources” (Office of 
National Statistics website).    
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believed in a free and flexible labour market and placed great emphasis on international cost 
competitiveness and therefore on pay flexibility particularly at the bottom end of the market.    
 
Figure 2 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, "The effects of taxes and benefits on household 
income, 2011/12", May 2013    
 
The minimum wage did little to obstruct the operation of New Labour’s model: set at a low 
level, it had no majormajor impact except at the very bottom end of the earnings distribution 
while in-work benefits meant that tax-payers were subsidising employers.  Even worse, the 
existence of government funded top-ups imposed a moral hazard on these employers,  
encouraging them to persist with low pay. Though the minimum wage was subsequently 
uprated, it remained low, below the recognized international definition of low pay (less than 
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two thirds the median hourly wage). Taken together, Labour's policies - the New Deals, 
measures for skills formation, and the minimum wage - did little to reduce the incidence of 
low pay in the UK economy.  Thus, by 2010, it was not clear that employment was a route 
out of poverty. In 2005around 22 per cent of those in work were poor - more than in most 
other European countries (Lloyd and Mayhew, 2010, 429).  
 
Taking into account the impact of the tax and benefit system, the distributional outcome is 
different. Looking at gross income, the impact of benefits appears to have halted the rise in 
inequality by the beginning of the 1990s with little movement thereafter.  Bringing direct 
taxation into the story (post tax income) alters the data yet again with inequality 
demonstrating two peaks, one at the beginning of the 1990s and the other at beginning of the 
2000s with little discernible fall in inequality in the last decade.  The same general pattern is 
apparent after allowing for indirect taxation (post tax income). On these aggregate measures, 
therefore, it is hard to see much general diminution in inequality during the Labour 
government. At the level of decile groups, real income grew for the second, third, fourth 
groups by more than it did for the seventh, eight, and ninth ones, indicating a greater equality 
between these bands. But such a pattern was offset by the poor performance of the first 
decile, the very poorest (whose real income fell), and by the strong growth of the tenth – the 
richest – band (Sefton et al, 2009, 25). 
 
Considering the very lowest reaches of the income distribution gives an indication  ofcwhat 
happened to deprivation. Largely as a result of higher benefits, the overall rate of poverty fell 
from 25.3 % in 1996-97 to 22.5 % in 2007-08.  These figures are based on official definitions 
and include allowance for housing costs. Child poverty fell from 26 per cent in 1998/99 to 20 
per cent in 2009/10. Qualifications are required.  First, the government’s own targets for 
poverty reduction were not met. Partly, this failure stemmed from poverty being defined in 
relative terms making it a hard target to achieve: as incomes rose so too did the yardstick by 
which deprivation was measured (Sefton, 2009, 41). Second, as Figure 2 demonstrates, the 
persistence of very low disposable income was marked.  The United Kingdom had become 
one of the most unequal countries in Western Europe under preceding Conservative 
governments: it remained so under New Labour.  The national minimum wage narrowed 
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earnings dispersion at the very bottom of the labour market, whilst changes to taxes and 
benefits had some impact at various points on the distribution of income, but perhaps the best 
that can be said for Labour’s period of office is that such measures halted the general rise in 
inequality experienced under the Conservatives.   
 
4. The Social Model and the Economic Crisis  
Unsurprisingly, the financial and economic problems that emerged in 2008 had a major 
impact on the United Kingdom. For several decades, and especially since the mid-1990s, the 
financial sector had become increasingly important to the British economy. In 2002 Brown 
placed its share of GDP at 5 per cent; four years later he put it at 7 per cent. Alistair Darling, 
his successor as chancellor, gave a figure of 10 per cent in 2008. Toynbee and Walker chart a 
shift from 5.3 per cent to 9.1 per cent over the same period (2010, p. 74). Cobham et al quote 
a study suggesting that the financial sector’s growth rate had been around 6.1 per cent  - 
roughly double that of GDP (2013, 8). Whilst in employment terms the sector was far less 
important, its salience meant that the United Kingdom was immediately exposed to any 
downturn in financial markets. It also meant that tax revenues generated from financial 
services made an important contribution to Labour’s expanding public spending 
commitments in this period (Moran et al, 2010, 100). 
 
Labour was not responsible for the speculation across the developed world that triggered the 
economic crisis: however, it had developed a deliberately “light touch” approach to financial 
regulation (one based on a 1986 Conservative initiative). In 1997, after granting 
independence to the Bank of England, Labour  transferred its responsibilities for bank 
supervision to a new regime. Frequently thereafter ministers claimed credit for the relatively 
light regulatory framework, arguing that it was a major cause of the country's impressive (by 
historical standards) economic performance. In his 2006 Mansion House speechBrown 
(2006) typically argued that the United Kingdom would “advance with light touch regulation, 
a competitive tax environment, and flexibility.”  
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The economic crisis began during 2007 with defaults on loans that were uncovered by 
realisable assets (Kavanagh and Cowley2010). Several financial institutions found 
themselves in severe difficulties. The crisis was worsened by the “credit crunch”, a reluctance 
by financial institutions to extend credit to each other (and elsewhere, including the housing 
market), as a result of uncertainty about how far each was exposed to bad debt. House prices, 
having soared under the Labour administration, stagnated or, in places, fell raising questions 
about the sustainability of asset-based welfare being generated by increased home ownership. 
Large-scale public interventions were required to support UK financial institutions. Northern 
Rock, a British bank, ran into trouble in September 2007: in February of the following year, 
the Labour government decided, reluctantly, to nationalise it. Six months later, it took another 
institution, the Bradford and Bingley, into public ownership.  In October 2008, one month 
after Lehman Brothers had collapsed in the United States, the government extended help to 
the Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS and Lloyds TSB. By 2009 much of the banking sector 
was in public hands, an outcome not without irony given New Labour’s utter hostility to 
natioalisation. By the end of 2008 the British economy was in a recession that would continue 
until the autumn of the following year: GDP fell by around 6 per cent. Unemployment had 
already been rising for some years. By 2009 it was higher than when Labour had first been 
elected (though it rose by less than during the previous recession in the 1990s – Cobham, 
2013, 53).  
 
The economic crisis starkly exposed Labour’s economic model. Expensive and ambitious 
welfare commitments relied on buoyant revenue streams which in the event proved fragile. 
The initial scale of public sector expansion (largely to fund health and education) left public 
finances extremely exposed to any reduction of tax revenues. Tax receipts fell markedly as 
GDP declined. As the recession worsened, public spending increased further as automatic 
stabilisers in the form of social security payments kicked in. The unplanned bailout of 
financial institutions put further pressure on public finances. The result of these combined 
factors was a dramatic increase in public debt. The Institute for Fiscal Studies had warned 
Labour about its fiscal plans back in 2005 (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005, 75). But in 2009-10, 
according to Toynbee and Walker (2010, 79), Labour borrowed more than it had in the entire 
period between 1997 and 2008 .  
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Quite how far Labour was responsible for this fiscal crisis is an open question. The economic 
crisis, of course, was an international one, driven in large part by developments in the United 
States. The United Kingdom entered the recession with relatively low public debt compared 
to other industrialised countries. Moreover, the ratio of debt to GDP was lower than when 
Labour had entered office in 1997 at around 40 per cent (Cobham et al, 2013, 7). Broadly 
speaking the golden rule – that borrowing should only fund investment over the economic 
cycle – was met until the crisis. After 2010, Ed Balls (2011) unapologetically noted that 
“before the global financial crisis, Britain had a lower deficit and a lower national debt than 
Labour inherited from the Conservatives in 1997.” From this perspective the increase in 
public debt was a straightforward, rational response to an exogenous shock.  
 
Critics responded that Labour had relied on over-optimistic growth forecasts to justify its 
spending plans and its ability to borrow in later years rested heavily on its probity during 
1997-99 (Cobham et al, 2013, 8). More importantly they indicated that it was Labour’s 
particular approach – combining minimal regulation with ambitious spending commitments 
and expensive programmatic interventions – that had left the United Kingdom so exposed to 
such a shock. Moreover, the crisis raised fundamental questions about that strategy: how 
could the mechanisms – consumer credit and a buoyant housing market - that had appeared to 
transmit prosperity from the City of London to other areas of the United Kingdom economy 
between the mid-1990s and 2008 be sustained? By 2008, they were no longer working. In 
any case, Labour had done little to combat rapidly rising housing prices.  
 
The initial policy reaction to the slump, widely praised by many economists, included a 
relaxation of monetary policy as the independent Bank of England cut the interest rate 
steadily from December 2007 onwards until it bottomed out at 0.5 per cent in March 2009 
(Cobham, 2013,65). Between March 2009 and February 2010, the Bank further eased 
monetary policy through a series of asset purchases known as quantitative easing. As well as 
bailing out the banks, Labour eased its fiscal stance generally in November 2008 through a 
temporary cut in VAT (value added tax). In all, Labour offered a relatively modest 
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discretionary fiscal stimulus between 2008 and 2010 (automatic stabilisers complemented 
such intervention, of course) – just under 2 per cent of fiscal balance. Most other 
industrialized countries did more (Barnes and Wren, 2013, 290). 
 
By 2010, however, significant changes had been made to Labour’s original response to the 
economic crisis. Monetary policy remained loose but fiscal policy had been tightened. 
Alistair Darling, as chancellor, announced a plan to halve the size of the public deficit in four 
years based on tax increases, spending cuts, and constraints on public sector pay. Tax 
increases included VAT and national insurance. Labour had finally scheduled an increase in 
the higher rate of income taxation. For a period the Brown government had attempted, 
rhetorically, to contrast Labour’s “investment” with proposed Conservative “cuts”. After such 
prevarication, the government indicated that there would have to be cuts in planned 
expenditure programs. However, opinion remained divided within the administration: some 
senior figures, most notably Ed Balls, proposed a more moderate and slower approach to 
deficit reduction. 
 
There is some controversy as to how far the social model as developed by Labour 
ameliorated the unemployment that resulted from the recession. The fall in GDP varied 
across countries, as did the strength of macro policy reactions. Correcting for these 
differences, however, generally speaking those OECD countries with strong employment 
protection, greater collective bargaining coverage and a greater willingness to adopt work 
sharing arrangements experienced smaller rises in unemployment (Amable and Mayhew, 
2011). Proponents of liberal market economies might claim that such gains are temporary but 
the avoidance of hysteresis effects suggests longer term benefits for countries with a different 
social model to that of the United Kingdom.  Notwithstanding these comparative findings, the 
fact remains that the rise in UK unemployment was less than might have been expected from 
the experienceof previous recessions.  We discuss this further later in the chapter.   
 
The recession impacted directly on the electorate’s perceptions of Labour’s economic 
competence. For more than a decade and a half, Labour had dominated the economic 
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argument between the two main parties since the United Kingdom’s ejection from the ERM 
in September 1992. In the spring of 2008, the party’s long ascendancy on the issue came to 
an abrupt end (Ipsos Mori, 2012). Opinion polls indicated that the electorate now concluded 
the Conservatives to have the better policies on the economy. The Conservative lead was not 
great, however, even as the recession worsened (and Labour continued to have a 
commanding advantage on health policy, a reflection of its longstanding commitment to the 
NHS). Voters’ perceptions on the economy were reflected in voting intentions and in the 
result of the 2010 general election. The Conservatives’ enjoyed a narrow lead running up to 
the ballot. They did not do sufficiently well, however, to gain a majority in the House of 
Commons, winning 306 seats (out of 650 in total) to Labour’s 258 and the Liberal 
Democrats’ 57. 
 
After Labour: Austerity and the Coalition 
After a few days’ negotiations,  the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats reached an 
agreement to form a coalition administration. From the start, the new government placed 
considerable emphasis on austerity as the basis for its program: the agreement underpinning 
the Coalition stated “We recognise that deficit reduction, and continuing to ensure economic 
recovery, is the most significant issue facing Britain.” George Osborne, as the new 
chancellor, immediately initiated a series of reductions to spending programs that went well 
beyond Labour’s deficit reduction plan. In July 2010 he announced scything cuts, exceptional 
in their size as well as the speed with which they would be introduced, followed later that 
year by a cap on particular benefits as part of an overhaul of social security (Taylor-Gooby 
(2012). The Coalition also shifted the balance in debt reduction: a greater proportion  would 
be covered by spending cuts (put at 80 per cent) as opposed to tax increases (20 per cent) than 
had been the case under Labour. In 2013, the IFS estimated the outturn at 85:15 (Johnson, 
2013, 2).  
 
By contrast to this fiscal austerity, monetary policy under the Coalition remained lax. The 
Bank of England kept the interest rate at 0.5 per cent: its new governor indicated in July 2013 
that it would remain so until unemployment started to fall. Earlier, in 2011, the Bank initiated 
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another round of quantitative easing. Indeed, in contrast to Eurozone economics, the capacity 
to operate an autonomous monetary policy was a great benefit to the British economy. In 
particular, it made borrowing much easier for the Coalition and cheaper than insome 
Eurozone economies.  Traditionally economists argue that sovereign debt denominated in a 
country’s own currency causes less servicing problems than one denominated in a foreign 
currency.  In the former case a country can issue more bonds valued in domestic currency and 
print the money needed to service the interest payments.   By contrast if the debt is in a 
foreign currency, an increase in the domestic money supply is likely simply to lead to a 
depreciation of the exchange rate making it even more difficult to service the interest 
payments.  Historically this was a dilemma faced by developing economies.  The problems of 
countries like Greece or Italy, however, are analogous.  They can issue bonds denominated in 
euros but cannot increase the money supply to ease the servicing burden.  As financial 
markets lose confidence in such governments, then interest rates demanded become ever 
higher as therefore does the servicing burden.  This can reach the point where lenders believe 
that sovereign debt levels are unsustainable.  Osborne did little to exploit the UK’s room for 
manoeuvre: by contrast he persisted in austerity insisting that cuts in public spending 
remained necessary. By 2012, international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund 
counselled the Coalition against the severity of its austerity policy, arguing that the pace of 
deficit reduction was too swift.  
 
Between 2010 and 2012, economic growth faltered as the United Kingdom slipped briefly 
back into recession (subsequent data indicated that the “double dip” recession may not have 
taken place). Critics blamed Osborne’s cuts for taking too much demand out of the economy 
too quickly and suggested that such austerity was “self-defeating” (Holland and Portes, 
2012).Moreover, the strategy did not cut debt as quickly as the Coalition had hoped and 
ministers accepted that it would take longer to reduce the deficit. Commentators pointed out 
that the squeeze on public spending would continue well into a second parliament after a May 
2015 general election (the Coalition committed itself to a full fixed term in office). 
 
Given the latitude afforded by monetary policy and the concerns of those such as IMF, some 
suggested that Osborne’s program was motivated by ideological concerns. Arguably, the 
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reduction in spending  provided cover for an assault on aspects of the social model – such as 
reduced welfare provision and cuts in benefits (seeKrugman, 2012). Many of the reductions 
had a dispoprortionate impact on the less well off, particularly women (Taylor-Gooby, 2012, 
64-65). Such an account was obviously consistent with previous Conservative polemics about 
the need to reduce state interventions in the economy based upon a New Right philosophical 
outlook. Significant cuts institigated by the Coalition included time limitations on benefits 
and restrictions on housing benefit including a constraint on the number of bedrooms to 
which recipients were entitled (benefit was reduced if beneficiaries had a spare room). By 
2013, the National Housing Federation, a body representing housing associations, estimated 
that around half of the households affected by the so-called “bedroom tax” were in debt as a 
result – around 300,000 in total, many of which were in receipt of disability benefit (Ramesh, 
2013, 7). However, in other aspects, particularly in his rhetoric, Cameron’s approach was 
quite pragmatic. With the projection of a “Big Society”, he attempted, with limited success, 
to justify theoretically the reduced state interventions necessitated by spending cuts as being 
part of a more communitarian approach to policy. Rather like Blair’s “Third Way” in the late 
1990s, the Big Society failed to generate sustained political discourse and was, to all intents 
and purposes, quietly dropped. By September 2013, the Coalition had indicated that there 
would be a further tightening of benefit eligibility including drastic cuts for the young 
unemployed. 
 
A particular puzzle concerned unemployment under the Coalition.  GDP had fallen sharply 
(by over 5 per cent) in 2009.  Thereafter growth was slow and halting – 1.7 per cent, 1.1 per 
cent and 0.2 percent in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively.  Unemployment rose significantly 
at the start of the recession and was nearly 2 percentage points higher in 2009 than in 2008.  
However, as already noted, this was a smaller rise than would have been expected from the 
UK’s experience of previous recessions.  Moreover in 2010 the unemployment rate rose only 
a little further but then effectively stabilised.   Meanwhile by 2013 the level of employment 
was higher than at the outset of the recession.  Putting the employment and unemployment 
figures together suggests that under the Coalition employment rose by just enough to absorb 
the increase in labour supply, thereby making little impression on the level of unemployment.  
Nevertheless at first sight the labour market picture appears more favourable than the UK’s 
historical experience might have led us to expect. Coalition supporters put this down to the 
31 
 
virtues of the increased flexibility of the labour market and there is indeed some truth in this.  
One dimension of this flexibility was exhibited in a falling real wage.  Another dimension is 
more contentious.  Bell and Blanchflower (2013) introduced an index of underemployment – 
defined as when a worker wants to work more hours than available from the employer.  They 
calculated that the underemployment rate had increased from 6.2 per cent of the workforce in 
2008 to 9.9 per cent in 2012.  Of course there may also be workers who would wish to work 
fewer  hours.  Bell and Blanchflower argue that this group was more or less the same size as 
the underemployed group between 2001 and 2007.  However by 2012 the underemployed far 
outnumbered the over employed and, on their calculations, the index of the unemployed plus 
underemployed  stood at 9.9 per cent as compared to unemployment rate of 8 per cent.  A 
particularly extreme form of potential underemployment was the zero hours contract and a 
2013 press release from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development suggested that 
about one million workers were on such contracts.  Perhaps even more worryingly it is 
arguable that the present high levels of measured unemployment represent a higher NAIRU 
(Elsby and Smith, 2010;see also Table 1).  Unsurprisingly the composition of employment 
shifted dramatically with between 300,000 and 400,000 jobs being lost in the public sector 
during the first two years of the Coalition (Emmerson 2013; Johnson, 2013). The IFS 
indicated that, in all, around one million public sector jobs might go by 2018. 
 
Sweeping cuts notwithstanding, the institutional configuration of the social model in the 
United Kingdom shaped the Coalition’s program in a striking fashion. In particular, regarding 
social welfare, there were powerful continuities between the trajectory established by Labour 
in office and the measures adopted by the new administration. It promised to ring-fence 
spending on the NHS and on schools (though over parts of the education budget were cut). 
Spending reductions were focused on local government, and community budgets as well as 
justice and the environment. But aside from defence, education, transport, and climate change 
as well as health and international development (both of which rose), they averaged over 20 
per cent per department. At the same time that the Coalition protected the NHS, however, it 
also announced organisational reforms to it, proposing to devolve powers to GPs (general 
practice doctors as opposed to hospital specialists) and more private sector involvement. 
Almost immediately both coalition partners backed off, slowed down the pace of reform, and 
disowned aspects of the initiative. Alongside the spending commitment, such caution was an 
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indication of the powerful political constraints  shaping health policy in the United Kingdom 
and, as Paul Pierson (1994) had argued in the mid-1990s, of the tenacity of certain 
institutions. It indicated a generic lack of trust on the part of the electorate towards the 
Conservatives. Cuts to health were further constrained by Liberal Democrat participation in 
the coalition. The Coalition did eventually proceed: the 2012 Health and Social Care Act 
once again reorganised the provision of treatment  and enhanced the role of the private sector. 
 
Elsewhere were other continuities: whilst New Deal interventions were terminated, the new 
Work Programme was based on much the same, though possibly even harsher, welfare-to-
work philosophy (Portes, 2012). The government indicated that it would simplify social 
security benefits, tightening regulations and restricting eligibility further to reduce welfare 
dependency.  Although earnings inequality increased under the Coalition, inequality of net 
incomes actually diminished because of the redistributive effects of the tax benefit system.  
On conventional measures the incidence of poverty also fell, but this was because the poverty 
line was reduced as average earnings fell – in absolute terms the poor became worse off 
(Cribb et al, 2013). 
 
Employment relations differed little from arrangements under the Labour government.  The 
Coalition placed less emphasis on individual employee protection and offered less respect for 
the relevant European Union Directives. But it continued to support unionlearn (a TUC skills 
initiative launched in 2006) and the Union Learning Fund (in place since 1998) though the 
sums involed were quite small. More importantly, David Cameron resisted pressure from his 
own party to weaken legislative protection against unfair dismissal and to toughen up anti-
strike provisions.  He commissioned Adrian Beecroft’s report, published in 2012, on 
employment protection legislation which advocated a severe reduction in it. The report 
represented a strand of Conservative thinking that questioned fundamentally the kind of 
social model inherited by the Coalition: it had little, if any, impact on policy-making. The 
Coalition was more tolerant of exclusions from the system of protection such as that for mini-
jobbers in Germany (or, as already exists, for temporary agency workers in the United 
Kingdom). Proposed public expenditure cuts (over pension arrangements) prompted public 
sector strikes. Following the recommendation of the Low Pay Commission, in 2013, the 
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Coalition uprated the minimum wage by less than the rate of inflation. Perhaps more striking 
parliamentary answers revealed that between June 2010 and February 2013 there were no 
prosecutions for failing to pay it (between 2007 – the date of the first action - and 2010 there 
had been eight – Hansard, 25 January 2013, col 458; and Hansard 7 February 2013, col 434.)  
 
Like its Labour predecessor, the Coalition put skills and training at the centre of its discourse 
about national economic success and social justice. The Coalition placed as much emphasis 
on education and training as a means to improve productivity New Labour’s rhetoric about 
labour market empowerment through improved human capital persisted. Despite this 
continuity, however, education and training budgets were slashed. The Educational 
Maintenance Allowance was abolished in England. Train to Gain was ended and the 
programs which replaced it involved significantly  reduced spending.  There was increased 
emphasis on funding high quality apprenticeships, but any improvements in the quality of 
government subsidised work-based training appeared rhetorical rather than real (National 
Audit Office, 2012).  
 
5. Conclusions 
Between 1997 and 2010 New Labour shaped the social model in the United Kingdom in a 
number of significant and distinctive ways including expanded health provision and 
interventions to help the unemployed into work. Underpinning these initiatives was an 
approach based on the importance of a flexible labour market as well as a buoyant financial 
sector which together contributed to the generation of a surplus to fund such activities. Some 
scholars concluded this approach to be an essentially neoliberal one that had much in 
common with the preceding Conservative administration (Taylor, 2005, 204; Hay, 1999). In 
the analysis of New Labour's approach to the social model, however, it is important to 
distinguish its often polemical discourse from the detail of its policy measures. At times there 
appeared to be a painful contradiction between some of the government’s interventions (as 
designed by Brown) and the neoliberal discourse offered by Blair. Both rhetoric and policy 
can be further contrasted with outcomes. Often, interventions failed to offset the inequality 
generated by exogenous factors. That Labour relied heavily upon work as the route by which 
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to tackle poverty further limited the government's success since frequently groups outside the 
labour market did not benefit as much as those within it - for example those not in work 
without children (Sefton et al, 2009, 33). 
 
Broad similarities between the program adopted by the Conservatives before 1997 and by 
New Labour thereafter and in the rhetoric frequently deployed by senior figures within those 
governments hide significant differences. New Labour was more prepared to intervene in the 
promotion of flexible labour markets. The myriad of New Deals were based on a model of 
systematic market failure (in the supply of workers) and the necessity of state intervention to 
correct that failure that went far beyond anything offered hitherto by the Conservatives. The 
illiberal impetus of these measures exceeded that attempted by the Thatcher and Major 
governments between 1979 and 1997. In addition, the scale of tax and spend involved in New 
Labour's policies should not be underestimated. Brown's measures to integrate the tax and 
benefits systems were based on a manifest redistributive impulse. In this regard, political 
partisanship remained relevant in assessing UK policy and outcomes (Bermeo and Pontusson, 
2012, 20-21). Ministers did little, however, either to flag their social democratic credentials 
or to articulate their initiatives as part of a comprehensive reformist approach. Moreover, 
caution needs to be exercised in determining just how coherent Labour’s model was in office. 
Blair’s agenda from September 2001 onwards was heavily shaped by foreign policy 
concerns. As important, throughout his time as chancellor and subsequently as premier, 
Brown was more interested in the pragmatic character of particular initiatives than he was in 
the overall narrative that underpinned such measures.  
 
It would be equally mistaken to characterise New Labour as an orthodox social democratic 
party in some form or other. In terms of principles, an integrated model based on duties and 
contracts replaced one based largely on rights and trust. In mapping out its approach to the 
social model, both Blair and Brown's governments appeared to reject firmly the kind of 
arrangements to be offered by conventional reformist parties (or in Europe more generally, 
for that matter) in favour of their own particular approach. From the party’s first days in 
office after 1997, Blair’s antipathy to what might be called the European model was manifest. 
In June 1997, in a calculated insult, he told a meeting of the Party of European Socialists at 
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Malmo that “There is a choice of destiny which confronts us in Europe. Stay as we are and 
fail. Change, embrace the future and succeed…We modernise or die.” His words were 
reinforced six months later when he concluded: “We need to reform the European social 
model not play round with it.” Of course, European social democracy has not remained static 
in the last decade. How much any developments in it reflected the influence of Tony Blair, 
alongside Gordon Brown, and how much New Labour’s rhetoric has fully permeated the 
general discourse of reformist politics on the continent is an open question. The 1999 Blair-
Schröder statement, however, like other documents and speeches, emphasises a break with 
the past and makes clear a distance with Europe more generally: ‘To make the European 
economy more dynamic, we need to make it more flexible’ (Blair and Schröder, 2000, 168).   
 
How is the political basis of New Labour distinctive approach to be understood? In influential 
papers, including a chapter in this volume, Torben Iversen and David Soskice advance a 
model of redistributive policies that places considerable weight on the political system and 
the type of distributional coalition that follows from it (Iversen and Soskice, 2006). In the 
British case, majoritarian institutions might be expected to lead to centre-right governments 
in which middle class voters ally themselves with the better off to limit redistributions. Of 
course, this logic does fit aspects of the UK social model under successive Conservative 
governments during the 1980s and 1990s. Whether this model captures the specificities of the 
British case and New Labour’s domination of politics between 1997 and 2010 is much less 
clear. New Labour's original coalition of support was far more encompassing than the two 
class alliance depicted in the Iversen-Soskice scheme: it was defined by a generic anti- 
Conservativism and by the trauma of the ERM crisis in 1992 far more than it was by 
redistributive or tax-cutting positions. Following on from that, the coalition remained ill-
defined as new issues cut across its base, most obviously of course intervention in Iraq. The 
Iversen-Soskice model captures neither the complexities of Labour's social program nor the 
pragmatism of particular initiatives. Moreover, certain initiatives developed by New Labour 
(and for that matter by the Coalition government since 2010) were directly costly for middle 
class voters (most obviously university tuition fees), the very group which should have been 
most insulated from tax increases in this model. Nor were these measures directed to benefit 
“insiders”, the core of the social democratic economic base in the form of skilled workers as 
David Rueda's work indicates is likely to be the case (Rueda, 2007). Between 1997 and 2010 
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nearly five million electors abandoned Labour: around four million by the time of the 2005 
general election in the wake of the Iraq war. By 2010, Labour's support base further 
haemorrhaged in the aftermath of the banking crisis, perceptions of government 
incompetence, and allegations of sleaze. Renegotiations of the distributional demands of 
particular groups played little part in this process as Labour lost votes across the class 
spectrum. (Labour lost more support from class groups C2 and DE than A, B and C1 but the 
latter groups are larger within the electorate: the party’s vote declined most dramatically not 
in the middle class south but in East of the UK, the Midlands, the North-East and Yorkshire; 
Hunter, 2011)To be sure, Britain's Westminster system shapes the capacities enjoyed by any 
government with a majority of MPs in the House of Commons. It did not define the 
distributional trajectory taken by Labour after 1997. Above all, Labour never constructed a 
durable political coalition, along the lines proposed by Peter Gourevitch’s “Politics in Hard 
Times” approach, with which to underpin its initiatives (Gouevitch, 1986; Bermeo and 
Pontusson, 2012, 21-23). 
 
With hindsight it is manifest that New Labour’s second term in office was utterly dominated 
by foreign policy, and in particular the invasion of Iraq, with profound consequences for its 
domestic agenda. Without such a focus, Blair would have been likely to pursue a far more 
radical “public service reform” agenda, oriented around greater choice. Blair’s initiatives in 
this area were obstructed by a lack of support within his party, most obviously exhibited in 
the tensions between him and Gordon Brown. Conflict between the two politicians hampered 
the development of a coherent strategy. Key features of Blair’s trajectory – foundation 
hospitals, academy schools, fees for higher education - were fiercely resisted within his party. 
Whether out of ambition or principled opposition, Brown was lukewarm towards the 
specifics of this agenda. Such an arrangement reflected an internal party politics where 
neither key actor enjoyed authority but both had veto powers (and uncertain future 
trajectories) leading to a permanent disequilibrium. From 2003 much of Blair’s political 
capital was sunk into generating and sustaining support for the invasion of Iraq and dealing 
with its catastrophic consequences. His overall weakness limited his capacity to pursue 
simultaneously a radical domestic agenda: in effect a trade-off prioritised foreign policy. In 
2007, many commentators and others expected a dramatic change when Brown finally 
became prime minister. It never really happened. Like Blair with Iraq, he seemed swamped 
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with the financial crisis and remained intensely practical in his orientation. Brown’s general 
philosophy, underneath his pragmatism, seemed quite similar to that of Blair: a focus on 
responsibility, contracts, and work. In interviews he talked about choice and responsibilities 
in much the same way that his predecessor had. Even if Brown did not share Blair’s public 
sector reform agenda precisely, the policies he articulated were pretty much the same. After 
more than a decade in office, Labour struggled to offer a narrative of what it was doing, why 
it was doing it and what it wanted to achieve. The party’s 2010 general election manifesto 
was widely criticised as lacklustre. 
 
The economic crisis exposed profound weaknesses with New Labour's articulation of the 
social model. In opposition in the 1990s, Labour was cautious, promising that there would be 
no return to tax and spend. In office, the party emphasised flexible labour markets as the basis 
for sustained economic growth, and an end to boom and bust. Many erstwhile supporters 
were profoundly disappointed with the emphasis placed on material growth at the apparent 
expense of distributional concerns. In the event, the failure to regulate the financial sector 
coupled with ambitious spending commitments left the economy perilously exposed to the 
kind of shock that took place in 2007-8. Such economic failure had, of course, profound 
consequences for Labour's electoral standing as well, evidenced at the 2010 general election.  
 
Subsequently, the configuration of the social model in the United Kingdom has constrained 
the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition. The model’s institutional tenacity, coupled 
with electoral calculation, has shaped George Osborne’s program of austerity in significant 
ways, most notably in the protection of health spending. That stated, the Coalition’s 
approach, notably the extent of cuts in spending and the dogmatism with which they have 
been imposed, represent an ideological challenge to existing arrangements. This challenge is 
likely to take two forms. First, cuts in spending may transform quantitative changes into 
qualitative ones (as provision can no longer be sustained in its current format) – what Pierson 
identifies as ‘systemic change’ (Pierson, 1994, 13; Taylor-Gooby, 2012, 63). Second, the 
dynamics of austerity create an opportunity to establish and legitimate an ideological agenda. 
Although, the United Kingdom’s particular configuration of the social model is well 
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established, particularly in the popularity of the NHS, it is manifestly under considerable 
pressure.  
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